After someone dies, the questions can sometimes become: who is allowed to live in their house? While the answer may be more straightforward for married spouses or for houses owned in joint tenancy, for example, that may not always be the case for common law spouses where legal title to the deceased person’s house was in the deceased’s name alone. The recent case of Tyndall v. Noyes, 2025 ONSC 1512 provides an overview of what it means for someone to have a “life interest/life estate” in a house after someone dies and the rights and entitlements that go along with that.
Facts and Background
In Tyndall, the applicant was the long-term common law spouse of the deceased. They resided together for approximately 24 years in the deceased’s house (the “House”) until the deceased’s death. They were in a continuous domestic relationship for that entire time, and the applicant was the deceased’s main caregiver near the end of the deceased’s life. They also had a Cohabitation Agreement, which stated that they agreed to mutually release each other from any and all claims to property and any right to claim against the estate of whomever died first. The respondent was the daughter of the deceased and estate trustee of the deceased’s estate.
The deceased died in March 2020, and one of the bequests in her Will permitted the applicant to “remain living in my house until his death”. The deceased was the sole owner of the House at the time of her death.
The applicant asserted that pursuant to this bequest, he had a full life interest or life estate in the House, including the right of exclusive possession (there were also disputes as to who was responsible for paying certain expenses related to the House, but that will not be discussed in detail in this blog).
While the respondent agreed that the applicant had the right to remain in the House until his death, she asserted that the applicant does not have exclusive possession of the House nor does he have the right to collect rents. Instead, the respondent asserted that the applicant has the right to reasonable use of the House, which will be fully maintained by the Estate.
Prior to the deceased’s passing, she was paying for the main expenses relating to the House including mortgage, property taxes, maintenance/repairs, utilities, and cable/phone. The applicant would contribute approximately $350 per month for expenses and would split the cost of things needed for the House, such as a lawnmower.
After the deceased passed away in March 2020, the House was transferred to her children (including the respondent) as residual beneficiaries. Between the deceased’s death and the beginning of the litigation, the applicant paid rent to the respondent “under protest” and paid for some utilities and cable as well. During the same time period, the respondent’s brother moved into the House with the applicant, though they lived on separate floors. However, the respondent’s brother was not a regular tenant of the House when the deceased was alive. The applicant asserted that he agreed to let the respondent’s brother live in the House on a short-term basis with the condition that he could revoke his consent at any time, and attempted to have the respondent’s brother vacate the House in May 2021 for being disruptive. The respondent refused to remove her brother from the House and maintained that the Estate has the right to permit her brother to live at the House with the applicant.
The Court’s Analysis
The Court’s analysis was focused on whether the applicant had a “life interest/estate” in the House and whether that included the right to exclusive possession. Ultimately, the Court was satisfied that the applicant had a life interest in the House which included a right of exclusive possession, but is subject to the applicant paying certain expenses related to the House.
The Court outlined the following principles:
Normally, the holder of life estate in a property is entitled to occupation of the premises and associated income from the property during his or her life tenancy. However, he or she also normally has offsetting obligations. In particular, a “tenant for life” or “life tenant” normally is bound to pay the taxes, interest on any mortgage debt, and any other annual outgoings for the preservation of the property, although expense for certain repairs to preserve the property may have to be borne by both the life tenant and those entitled to the remainder interest in the property.
However, a life tenant normally is not entitled to be reimbursed for more substantial capital repairs and improvements he or she voluntarily may have undertaken during the life tenancy, or for other costs associated his or her administration of the property.[1]
The holder of a “life estate” or “life tenant” generally has the right to immediate and exclusive possession of a property and is entitled to use it as its owner, subject to some restrictions intended to protect the rights of those entitled to possession at the end of the life estate. The life tenant is ordinarily responsible for current expenses and routine maintenance.[2]
The Court noted that it will take into account a wide range of factors when discerning the testator’s specific intentions and endorsed a context-based approach to determining whether a testator subjectively intended to gift a life estate or merely a licence to occupy (a “licence” with respect to real property is a privilege to go on premises for a certain purpose, but does not operate to confer on, or vest in, the licensee any title or estate in such property).
The respondent conceded that the applicant had a “life interest” but maintained that he did not have he full array of rights and entitlements that go along with a typical life interest. The respondent’s main point of contention was over the applicant’s asserted right of exclusive possession. The respondent argued that a right of exclusive possession is not included in a life estate.
In order to determine the extent of the applicant’s life interest in the house, the Court placed great emphasis on the words of the will noting that it expressly directs that the applicant can remain living in the house until his death. The Court further noted that while the will does grant the estate trustee (the respondent) the power to “lease” property, “it would be absurd to read the will as granting a right to lease the property outright as that would have the practical effect of impeding Mr. Tyndall’s right to live at the home for the duration of his life”.
The Court found that the deceased did not contemplate or intend the applicant to have to share the house with anyone else. Among other factors, there was nothing in the deceased’s Will or in the external circumstances to suggest that she wanted her Estate to be able to rent out or lease portions of the property while the applicant continued to reside there.
After taking into consideration a number of factors (the history of the applicant living in the house, the history of the respondent’s brother living there, the layout of the house ie. was it feasible for two people to live there completely separately, etc), the Court held that in this case, the applicant’s life interest included a right of exclusive possession.
[1] Ralston v. Ralston, 2016 ONSC 2937, at paras. 26-28.
[2] Tyndall v. Noyes, 2025 ONSC 1512, at para. 27.
